This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasidemocratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
Introduction and Problem Statement

Plan Implementation in Soviet command economy: case-study
Theoretically, a state directive plan implementation is a basic indicator of country development, a signal to the principal about agents' behavior, and a main coordination mechanism for the command economic system. Plan figures were formally regulated from an administrative centre -for example, in Soviet Union there was a certain regulatory authority, called the Genplan (general plan), that acted as a central supervisor and controller of this plan's creation and execution. However, Soviet plans included not only economic parameters but also other ones, for example, the number of state enemies who should be repressed 1 . According to the official position of the state, the plans were expected to be implemented unconditionally.
Nevertheless, despite all of the ideological claims and, in some cases, official reports, many plans were not fulfilled, and others were successfully overfulfilled. Analysing the USSR during the entire period of the command economic model's existence (especially under Stalin's dictatorship), we find that bureaus responsible for the plan implementery, had many of alternative behavior strategies. These strategies will be analyzed as the main research topic of this article.
For most of the branches in industrial and extraction sectors the first five-year period (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) , the beginning of Soviet Industrialization) plans were obviously overestimated.
Therefore bureaucrats on-site and in the central offices of branch ministries struggled to reduce the normative parameters, and finally most of the first economic plans numbers were cut down 2 .
There were constant conflicts concerning the plan between officials from the central authorityGenplan, branch heads (commissars) and members of the Politbureau, who reported on implementation of the plan to Stalin. Nevertheless, results of struggle for the decrease in parameters were quite evident. After the end of the first five-year period the approved and severely cut plan was implemented; moreover, some figures even exceeded normative characteristics.
For some kinds of output, for example the agricultural sector plans even higher than in industrial sector were accepted by branch officials without any coordinated opposition. And, more importantly, most of the plans were implemented, even if they led to negative external effects. For example, the overestimated plan for grain production in nonseed years in the beginning of 1930s that supposed one of the main causes for the great famine in rural areas of the Soviet Union.
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Moreover in Soviet economic history there were cases when plans were successfully implemented and even overfulfilled, but bureaus signaled the necessity of continuously increasing the normative indicators (and these advanced parameters were achieved as well). In this context, implementation of the plan for mass repressions is a case of special interest.
The plan for repression that is within the scope of our research was contained in the confidential Order 00447 "Operation on repression against former kulaki, criminals and other anti-soviet elements" of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) from 30.07.1937.
Those who were expected to be the victims of repressions according to the mentioned above Order were formally indicated; the Order also defined two basic categories of the repressed. The first category should be executed immediately, and the second category should be arrested and imprisoned. As a result, according to the initial plan the first category included 65 950 (including special NKVD camps -75 950) persons, and the second category included -193 000. 4 In the Order regional distribution of repressed persons correlated poorly with a regional population ratio.
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The bureaus were granted certain liberties in interpreting the plan -as a matter of fact, the reduction of normative figures on-site was expected by central authorities. Despite liberties the plan implementation, an inferior official could not abuse the position or break the plan 3 Kondrashin, 1991. 4 Source : Yakovlev, 2002, pp. 98-99 and Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin, 2006, p. 8. 5 Analyzing the plan revisions on-site in the regions, we will find more interesting results:
by estimated figures the final normative number of repressed persons was 356 105 people belonging to the first category and 397 210 people belonging to the second category. Ultimately, officials overfulfilled the plan on the first category, having shot 386 798 person, while for the second category there was some underfulfillment of the plan (380 599 people were imprisoned).
The total number of victims exceeded planned targets: 767 397 against 753 315. Thus, the general plan was implemented with an increase victims executed and a reduction in victims imprisoned in GULAG system.
To observe the situation in greater detail, we examine the behavior of officials during other mass repressions waves: dekulakization 8 (in the beginning of the 1930s) and repressions of certain nations (here we consider those beginning in 1938).
Under the Decree about dekulakization from 30.01.1930 persons subjected to repression were distinguished into two main categories: kulaks (active enemies) and lesser enemies, 6 Source for all figures on the pages 4-5: Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin, 2006, p. 8. 7 This initiative correlates poorly with the goal of efforts minimization (slack maximization) as one of the basic theoretic purposes of a bureau See: Wyckoff,1990. 8 A campaign against rich peasants and property owners (so-called kulaks) in rural areas of the Soviet Union.
including also kulaks' families 9 . Kulaks were to be executed or sent to special camps. There were certain plan figures: 60 000 active enemies belonging to the first category. Thus the plan did not specify the number of executed and imprisoned enemies. The plan figures were ultimately overfulfilled, as 65 000 kulaks were repressed and 18 000 of them were executed.
The situation with families of kulaks and less dangerous enemies was more ambiguous.
According to the Decree, this category was to be deported to the certain territories: transportation methods and living conditions for the deported enemies were rigidly defined. Instead of the normatively indicated 154 000 persons, it was possible to find and repress only 99 515 enemies.
The next steps of the dekulakization campaign focused on persons who were not deported to the special areas, but were forced to leave their area. Consequently, in the long-term period of dekulakization the plan figures for repressions were 726 000 -1 200 000 people (the variation was due to the third category). The whole plan was underfulfilled because the final number of repression victims was 500 000 -794 275. However the normative figures were achieved and even exceeded in the case of dangerous active enemies (the first category).
In a context of the present work, we take into account the repressions of certain nations (starting in 1938) . In this case, there were no special plans from superior officials. Though there were no national quotas, the behavior of officials could easily be supervised using Census data.
The potential victims were also distinguished into 2 categories: those who should be executed, and those who should be repressed in a certain way (generally deported). As there was no plan, it was impossible to define initially, how many person should be repressed under the first category, and how many under the second. In essence all problems were solved by officials (agents), both on-site, and in regional administrations of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. In total 247 175 persons were executed and 96 556 were deported. 10 Thus national purges were carried out precisely, accurately and in time: practically all representatives of indicated nationalities in the certain places were repressed, however other nationalities were exempted.
9 Later the third category of the least dangerous enemies was included in plan. The persons belonging to this category should be resettled within the region of their origin. 10 All data from Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin, 2006.
By January, 1 st , 1939 in Soviet camps (GULAG system) there were 443 262 prisoners arrested for counterrevolutionary crimes (less than 70 000 of them were actually spies, terrorists, or open opponents of the Soviet authority -they were not mass repression victims).
11
Nevertheless, about 380 000 victims of repressions in prisons is a figure approximately equal to the number of executed.
Role of Plan in the Soviet Politic System
Observing the cases above, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion, that the plan in reality was an unimportant document which nevertheless demanded performance. As a matter of fact, planned figures in many cases were accepted only for rough distribution of the resources necessary for achieving results. As the government (a party elite -Politbureau) and most of ministry major officials could not completely understand all areas of life in the country, the corrections and updatings in planned parameters from inferior branch officials were widespread.
In other words, in internal markets of bureaucracy, officials negotiated about resource grants and decreasing the key plan characteristics. Therefore, plan characteristics depended on bargaining power and informal internal communications of numerous bureaus' heads, from ministerial officials to executive directors of small bureaus, plants and factories. The plan functioned as a signal coming from the top to the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid about resources allocation and forthcoming output standards. At the same time, for high-level officials and dictator, plan implementation was not an accurate indicator of country development or agents' performance, due to numerous on-site corrections.
In order to supervise an official's conscientiousness, the dictator could use real figures about the output of certain goods or services (even if the state services are repressions) in a certain sector. Next, the dictator could define deviation based on different branch bureaus parameters in that sector. Thus, according to our hypothesis, punishment which should act as the basic incentive to activity and prevention of opportunistic behavior, in reality poorly depended 11 Data from Yakovlev, 2002. on the plan fulfillment, and was defined by comparing results of the given bureau activity with results of other bureaus engaged in similar production activity.
It is important to note, that it is difficult to consider specific features of bureau functioning which may not depend on officials' efforts. As a result, the repression system could punish both shirking bureaucrats (an active measure that raises the future output because negative incentives find addressees), and innocent non-shirking bureaucrats who made all necessary efforts (which, on the contrary, undermines stimulus to increase output) 12 in harsh distinguish the innocent from the guilty. In order to prevent creation of distorting incentives, he, likely, would make a decision to not apply repressions against the big group of defaulters. Now we shed light on the officials' strategies. According to the dictator's behavior and characteristics of the branch and bureau, the official believes a probability to be involved into the group of risk. In accordance of self-perception of probability to be punished for appearing in the list of the worst agents, the official can choose various strategy of behavior, as it is described in a formal model (it will be presented below). Thus, officials can be interested in either underfulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan, and sanctions can be imposed both on nonshirking and on shirking. The last phenomenon can stimulate agents not only to invest in reduction, but also in increase of the plan.
Administrative leverage overexpenditure
It is important to note that the logic presented in previous arguments and the model below In the articles the basic statements were proved 22 : the plan is an unimportant from the economic point of view document, the officials have a strong possibility and the possibility of officials to manipulate plan figures for resource redistribution.
Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin 23 observe mechanisms and reasons of mass repressions from the point of a rational dictator. The "principal-agent" problem and behavior of bureaucracy is beyond the scope of this research, but it puts emphasis on general patterns of dictator's behavior. Moreover, this work was used as statistical data source for analysis conducted in our article. The article by Sonin and Egorov 24 is devoted to agency relationship in totalitarian economy and features a model that explains why dictator prefers loyal agents to competent ones.
19 Wintrobe, 1990; 1998. 20 Lazarev and Gregory, 2003 . 21 Belova and Gregory, 2001. 22 Mechanisms of public administration are described in detail in Gregory's book The Political Economy of Stalinism. In this book the thesis about plan (even under Stalin's reign) being a result of intrigues and secret negotiations, but not being a scientific fundament of Soviet economy development, is proved. 23 Kalyagin and Sidorenko 25 propose models describing peculiarities of a dictator's behavior and comparison of the same actions under dictatorship and democracy. Although their paper accounted for criminal law enforcement under dictatorship, the article also describes some common mechanisms of enforcement and dictator's strategies to deal with his subordinated officials for shirking prevention. In other words, in case of punishment greater quantity of both innocent and guilty officials will get under repressions. We assume the same approach to the relationship between a dictator and his chain of command in this work.
The Model
Methodology
We observe relations between the dictator and officials from subordinated bureaus belonging to different branches. The dictator and chiefs of the bureaus are rational economic subjects, maximizing their utility function. The logic of our research is based on the assumption that the economic model is a command one with state ownership of capital goods. Therefore, all of the resources are distributed by a central governor (dictator) among the state bureaus (agents), producing different homogeneous goods (in this type of economic model not only public ones) or services. It is also assumed that basic conditions of the central plan varies randomly among different sectors and bureaus.
In the model the dictator always makes the first step, and he sets the rules as well. In the model, the agents cannot guess the dictator's behavior a priori, even taking into account previous situations. For this reason, they only respond on the situation ex post facto. The bureaus have various strategies to optimize their welfare functions under different conditions set by the dictator (please see paragraph 3.3. below).
Dictator's choice
We assume that, according to the exogenously established plan, the dictator makes a final decision about resources allocation among the different bureaus in various branches. However, 25 Kalyagin and Sidorenko, 2007. contrary to official claims, the dictator knows that the plan is not a reliable and scientific document. Therefore, the plan only represents the result of negotiations between various levels of administrative hierarchy, and only indicates an approximate quantity of resources available for allocation.
At the same time, the plan is not a direct signal for the dictator about his agents'
performance. Therefore, he will use other criteria as an indicator of an official's conscientiousness, for example, the real output of the bureau 26 , multiplied by a special correction factor a i >0, reflecting reasonable differences in conditions between homogeneous bureaus. In other words, a i is considered to be an indicator which shows a purity of signals to the dictator from the bottom.
Thus, if,
≥ agent i will be perceived by the dictator as non-shirking, and consequently, he cannot become a subject of punishment. The dictator's task consists in definition of optimum quantity of m bureaus, which should be punished, from n selection. As a result, for each branch the dictator will choose an optimum share of victims equal to n m * . We assume that based on random nature punishment can overtake with probability q either shirking (guilty) , or with probability r non-shirking (innocent) bureaucrat in objectively bad working conditions. The presence of an internal optimum n m < accept the precondition that punishment for the dictator costs 0, the choice of maximum heavy punishment will be optimum for him. As it will be shown below, such choice of the dictator is represented by a rather realistic precondition. The inequality (1) can be presented in the form of:
Let us go back to the signals, to a indicators, which are responsible for them. Their distribution depends on various parameters, the exact estimation of which is connected for the dictator with restrictively high costs: fields of activity of a bureau, branch, complexity of work, certain function of costs for each bureau, etc. And the more is the scattering of a parameters, the more ceteris paribus is the probability of dictator's type-I enforcement mistake, so that he will refuse random mass repressions with greater probability, being afraid to dramatically decrease incentives for the further bureaus or branch output. . Thus, the increase in number of examining enterprises or bureaus will reduce the uncertainty and dispersion of a, increasing the number of punished officials. According to these conditions the function of dictator's welfare shapes the following form 27 : 27 We assume that the dictator pays his agents market wages. Wage does not influence on decision making by dictator, so it is not reflected in his welfare function.
Where b is a value for the dictator of a certain good or service (it is supposed to be a constant); v i -the output produced by the bureaucrat i. It is important to notice, that the given parameter determines the output which is observable by the dictator because he cannot completely estimate efforts of the official. Thus, v consists of output which bureau really can produce adjusted for possible shirking x (x=0 in case of non-shirking). So by more detailed analysis function takes the form:
Further, p i is the plan for a bureau i; с 0 is a cost of one produced unit, it is supposed be the same for all goods and services, produced by a bureau; R -the premium for the plan fulfillment or overfullfilment 28 ; k -number of the bureaus fulfilling or exceeding the plan, for
Thus, the dictator solves a simple optimization task, and the unique variable on which its function of welfare is maximized will be the number of officials (or bureaus) that should be punished:
The model that is presented in the article explains the historical phenomena. For example, in the metallurgical industry there were a small number of responsible officials and conditions varied greatly at the different enterprises. For this reason, the dispersion of parameters is expected to be high, and signals to the dictator are expected to be strongly distorted. Hence, optimum number of punished agents, from the dictator's point of view, is insignificant, and the plan figures were regularly decreased. On the other hand, the plan for repressions of Soviet "enemies" was issued to all bureaus of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs system in administrative territorial districts of the USSR; conditions everywhere were approximately similar, and the procedure of checking up fulfillment (to count enemies) was a relatively easy 28 Premium is an exogenous variable. If we suppose it endogenous, the substantial conclusion of the model will remain the same, but mathematical manipulation will become more difficult.
task. In the case of repressions, the signals were clear and the dispersion was small, so fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan could be expected. Further, we shall consider various strategies of agents' reaction to the incentives put before them by the dictator.
Official's choice
In this model we accept following preconditions:
1. An official receives a certain number of resources from the dictator on fulfillment of the plan (it is coordinated by negotiations). It is possible to receive bonus -R for the plan fulfillment. In a general view the welfare function of the official in the certain branch will be presented as a following expression:
Where c p i 0 are the resources allocated by a bureau to fulfill the plan (a cost price of one produced unit, it is supposed to be common for all participants of a bureau); c i x i w i ) ( − -expenditures for performance of the plan in case of potential shirking, in case of shirking when
* is a possible punishment (validity is not important) which comes with probability u (thus probability depends on output and a share of punished in the given branch, please see above the model of the dictator's choice); c p p i 1 ) 1 ( − -expenditures for downturn of the plan from a level p i down to a level p 1 ; c p i p 2 ) ( 2 − -expenditures for increasing the plan from a level p i up to a level p 2 ; c 1 and c 2 are specific costs of a downturn and increase of the plan (they are supposed to be constant). Thus, the official has many possible alternative behavior strategies.
There are three main variants of official's perception of the plan's size: 1) an "underestimated" plan (we assume that rational agents will never choose a strategy "plan decreasing" if it is already underestimated); 2) an "overestimated" plan (the official cannot fulfill it without shirking); or 3) an "exact" plan, which is fulfilled by the official if he chooses a fair strategy, and it is not fulfilled in case of opportunistic behavior choice. The official can also choose either shirking or non-shirking strategy.
In the article below we shall observe the optimal equilibriums for each of these three variants more in detail.
"Underestimated" plan. If the plan is not great, and an official (or bureau) can fulfill it even without shirking, he has no reasons (within the restrictions of the given model) and no incentives to struggle for the plan reduction, because he will receive the premium in any case. On the other hand, struggle for increase of the plan can be the official's optimum choice as he can increase in this case his total output reducing the probability of punishment for himself.
Accordingly, four variants of official's behavior are presented in table 1. 
According to equations (6) -(9) official can choose one of the four strategies (the choice is determined by certain parameters).
"Overestimated" plan.
Unlike the previous case, if the plan for bureau i is overestimated, the official would find it beneficial to invest not only in reduction (this is clear intuitively), but also in increase of the plan as these investments can lead to reduction of probability and, in some cases, expected heaviness of the punishment for official. Thus, six variants of official's behavior are possible. Equations (10) and (11) within the restrictions of the given model do not satisfy participation constraints, so they cannot be considered as realistic strategies. All the other strategies may be dominating for officials (the choice depends on certain level of the parameters).
"Exact" plan.
In case when the plan fulfillment encourages fair behavior of an official with premium R, it makes sense to struggle for the plan reduction (if the official does not shirk). The results received by the official in this situation coincide with results which it receives for "underestimated" plans. If the official will choose shirking strategy, his results will be identical to the results received in case of shirking strategy by "overestimated" plan. 29 . If we assume that for an official, decision making is usually guided by costs, the mentioned behavior is reasonable. For example, the costs of execution are less than the costs of imprisonment or the costs of transportation to a detention center. Thus, the general plan was implemented due to the increased percentage of persons executed and the reduced percentage of persons sent to prison. So, plan fulfillment with fewer costs (and even overfulfillment, reducing expected costs of punishment for officials) occurred due to extension of a cheaper production output.
Examining from the same position the results for dekulakizations and repressions against nations (please see paragraph 1.1., we draw the conclusion that cost analysis is important and sometimes crucially required for modeling strategies of officials' behavior. Using cost examination we can explain additional phenomena from an economic point of view. Therefore, our next research topic will be cost-beneficial research of bureaucracy behavior under dictatorship.
29 Source: Gregory, Schröder, and Sonin, 2006, p. 8. 
